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Introduction 
 
It’s a truism that in light of the media’s power in shaping public opinion and discourse, it also has 
important obligations and responsibilities. Many of these obligations are frequently violated, and 
this doesn’t look like changing any time soon. In light of that, what are the obligations and 
responsibilities of consumers of the news media?  
 We can divide consumer-focused questions, very roughly, into three stages. At the first 
stage, there are questions about what media to consume: which newspapers to read, which 
television programmes to watch, who to follow on social media. At the second stage, there are 
questions about how to respond to the media that one does consume in belief-formation – whether 
to trust it at its word, dismiss it as “fake news”, or something intermediate. And at the third stage, 
there are questions about how to act on the basis of the beliefs one has arrived at. Roughly 
speaking, these three stages correspond to three more general agential processes: evidence-
gathering, forming beliefs on the basis of the evidence that one has gathered, and acting on the 
basis of those beliefs.  
 This paper focuses most directly on the first stage: our obligations as consumers in deciding 
what media to consume (though I’ll also at times discuss the second stage too). The view I’ll 
defend is that it is wrong for us to consume only, or overwhelmingly, media that broadly aligns 
with our own political viewpoints: that is, it is wrong to be politically “partisan” in our decisions 
about what media to consume. We are obligated to consume media that aligns with political 
viewpoints other than our own – to “diversify our sources”.1 When stated as a philosophical thesis, 
that may sound rather banal. But note that if this is an obligation, it is one that is evidently widely 
violated – even among well-educated and reflective people, and on all sides of the political 
spectrum. I take it that some of those who violate it even think they’re justified in so doing. And 
as we’ll see, whether or not they’re right turns on some subtle issues. 
  
1. Epistemic or Moral Obligation? 
 
One might ask: when I say we are obligated to consume media that aligns with political viewpoints 
other than our own, what kind of “obligation” am I talking about? Is it an epistemic obligation, or 
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moral obligation? In fact, the case of media consumption provides an example of how it can be 
harder to draw the boundaries between these categories than it first seems. 
 Recall the stages of consumption distinguished above. On what we might call an “austere” 
conception of the epistemic domain, beliefs are the only thing that can be evaluated epistemically. 
If this is right, only the second stage – forming beliefs on the basis of the media one consumes – 
can be evaluated epistemically. The first stage – that of deciding what media to consume – is, by 
contrast, is a practical decision, one that can only be governed by moral and prudential norms. And 
so (assuming it’s not prudential), my claim about an obligation to consume media that aligns with 
political viewpoints other than our own must be interpreted morally, rather than epistemically. The 
more general position here is that epistemic evaluation concerns how agents respond to their 
evidence, not what evidence they gather in the first place. 
 One might object, to such a view, that it yields unintuitive verdicts about agents who filter 
their evidence in very selective or biased ways, but respond correctly to the evidence that they do 
gather. It seems that the austere view says that such agents have epistemically justified beliefs – 
but it seems that there is something epistemically objectionable about such agents.  
However, there’s a reply to this objection on behalf of the austere view. When agents filter 
their evidence in very selective or biased ways, responding to that evidence correctly will involve 
discounting the apparent force of the evidence in light of the fact that it was biased. To illustrate 
with a case adapted from Roger White (2010, p. 586): suppose that you arrive at a party full of 
economics professors, and you’re interested in finding out whether interest rates will go up this 
year. You ask a number of the economics professors, and to your surprise you discover that they 
all agree: interest rates will go up this year. Normally, this would be at least somewhat good 
evidence that interest rates will go up this year. But suppose you now discover that every professor 
was asked, at the door to the party, whether they believe that interest rates will go up this year. 
Those that didn’t answer in the affirmative were quietly led away to another room and shot. So 
your sample was biased: only the professors who believed interest rates will go up made it into the 
room. Now you know that your sample was biased in this way, it seems that the evidence provided 
by the economics professors’ testimony loses much, perhaps even all, of its would-be force. And 
so the correct response to this evidence involves discounting it.  
So, the thought is, the same is true (to a lesser degree) when you yourself impose the 
selective or biased filter on your evidence. Though that is not itself the right sort of thing to be 
epistemically unjustified, the austere view says, it is epistemically unjustified to form beliefs that 
fail to discount the (would-be) force of this evidence in light of the biased nature of the filter.  
Still, the austere view isn’t home and dry yet. Consider again the case of the party, but now 
suppose that though every professor who didn’t believe that interest rates will go up was shot, you 
don’t have any way of knowing this. In this case, it seems clear that you’re not epistemically 
required to discount the evidence provided by the professors’ testimony. So what triggers the 
epistemic requirement to discount is not the fact that the evidence was selectively filtered, but 
rather your knowing that the evidence was selectively filtered. But now return to the case where 
you filter your evidence in selective and biased ways, and add that you don’t realize that you’re 
3 
 
filtering your evidence in these selective and biased ways. As in the party case, it seems like you 
then won’t be incorrectly responding to the evidence you have gathered if you don’t discount it: 
after all, you don’t realize it was selectively filtered. But, unlike the party case, insofar as you were 
the one who did the selective filtering, it seems like you’re still epistemically criticizable in some 
way. The obvious way to accommodate this is to say that the selective filtering was itself 
epistemically criticizable, but the austere view can’t say this, since it says that only beliefs are 
epistemically criticizable. 
Moreover, the austere view seems to fit better with an “ideal theory” approach to epistemic 
evaluation than with a “non-ideal theory” approach. The austere view says, in effect, that it doesn’t 
(epistemically) matter what evidence you gather, because you can always correct for any flaws in 
that evidence-gathering process through discounting later. But our own biases can be very hard to 
detect and correct for.2 A non-ideal epistemic theory that seeks to account for those cognitive 
limitations should cut the problem off at the source by imposing some constraints on the ways that 
we gather evidence in the first instance. That requires us to go beyond the austere view. I’m a 
pluralist about ideal vs. non-ideal theory, but I think of the project I’m engaged in as belonging to 
the latter category. 
Finally, insofar as one is aiming at true belief, or at knowledge – as opposed to merely at 
justified belief – it is clear that evidence-gathering procedures matter in and of themselves. Even 
if we consider a perfect epistemic agent who always responds to the evidence she has at any single 
point in time in a maximally justified way, it seems clear that she (usually) stands a better chance 
of arriving at a true belief, or at knowledge, if she gathers more, and better, evidence.3 This 
provides a good sense in which some evidence-gathering procedures are epistemically superior to 
others, even for agents who respond perfectly to the evidence that they have gathered.4 
Overall, then, I’m inclined to reject the austere view and say that we can have epistemic 
obligations that pertain to the gathering of evidence – and, specifically, that the obligation to 
consume media that aligns with viewpoints other than one’s own is one such epistemic obligation. 
However, there is a further way in which epistemic and moral obligation are entangled here. As 
our three-stage model illustrates, media consumption habits influence beliefs, which in turn 
influence behavior (such as voting and other political action). Now, we have moral obligations 
concerning these forms of behavior, and one of those moral obligations is plausibly that we base 
them on epistemically responsible beliefs,5 that have themselves been based on responsible 
gathering of evidence. It’s morally reckless to base important political decisions on epistemically 
irresponsible beliefs, or on beliefs based on very limited or selective gathering of evidence. This 
is an instance of a more general, undertheorized phenomenon, where it’s not just that our moral 
and epistemic responsibilities happen, luckily, to line up, but rather we’re morally required to be 
epistemically responsible as such.6   
 
2. First Competitor View: Consuming Only Unbiased Media Sources 
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My view, as I’ve said, is that we ought to consume news from media sources that align with a 
variety of different viewpoints across the political spectrum. An obvious competitor view is that 
we should simply consume news from media sources that are unbiased. However, it is not 
straightforward to say what makes a media source “biased” or “unbiased” in the relevant sense. I 
will contrast two different potential conceptions of bias, and suggest that neither is a good 
conception of what it is for the media to be biased. 
 On a first conception of what it is to be “unbiased”, to be unbiased is to be even-handed or 
neutral in one’s reporting. An unbiased media source is one that (at least when it comes to disputed 
or controversial matters) reports what the different views on the controversy are, without seeking 
to arbitrate between them as to which is true.7 On a second conception of what it is to be 
“unbiased”, to be unbiased is to be accurate. An unbiased media source is one that reports what is 
true (or what is most probably true on the evidence), and, to the extent that it reports views to the 
contrary, represents those views as false. For a nice illustration of how these conceptions of what 
it is to be unbiased can come radically apart, consider Elizabeth Anderson’s (2011) discussion of 
media coverage of climate change. Anderson charges that one of the sources of public distrust in 
climate science is “biased and misleading media reports” (Anderson 2011, p.153). More 
specifically, she suggests that one kind of biased, misleading media reporting consists in “a media 
norm favoring “balanced” reports, in which major scientific conclusions are “balanced” by 
contrary opinions, regardless of the weakness of the evidence for them.” Clearly, the conception 
of bias Anderson favors here is closer to second conception I just identified. Her charge is that 
sources that are “unbiased” in the first sense are, at least when it comes to climate change, ipso 
facto biased in the second (favored) sense.  
 In my view, Anderson is right that the first conception of bias has serious shortcomings. 
First, as she points out, even-handedly reporting contrary views on an issue on which the evidence 
is in fact quite clear creates false and misleading perceptions of inconclusivity or ambiguity in the 
evidence. Secondly, a media norm accord to which media sources must remain neutral on disputed 
or contested matters seems to significantly blunt the media’s role in exposing falsities and lies; if 
the media follows such a norm, it is too easy for malign actors to suppress the truth simply by 
denying it. Thirdly, it is on reflection clear that the media cannot represent all views on disputed 
topics; there simply isn’t time to represent all views, and not every crank can or ought to be heard. 
So the media is inevitably involved in making judgments about which views do need to be heard, 
a question that surely ought to be answered at least partly by asking which views are vaguely 
within the space of reasonable debate.8 If that’s so, the media can’t stay out of the game of 
arbitrating, to some extent, which views are reasonable and which aren’t. In light of this, the first 
conception of “unbiased” media reporting seems neither desirable nor attainable, and thus to 
constitute a poor criterion for which media we should consume. 
 Unfortunately, however, the second conception of bias also has its shortcomings. The 
primary among them, in my view, is this: given this conception of bias, it will always seem, from 
any individual’s point of view, that those who disagree with her on any given issue are biased. 
After all, believing some proposition p commits one to thinking that p is true, and so to thinking 
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of anyone who disputes it – including any media source that disputes it – as saying something 
false. But according to the second conception of bias, a media source is unbiased just to the extent 
that it reports the truth – and so, to the extent that it reports anything false, it is biased. But now it 
just follows that, from my perspective, any media source that says anything that I disagree with is 
ipso facto biased.9  
Of course, it doesn’t follow from this that everyone I disagree with actually is biased. 
Nevertheless, even the result that it seems from my perspective as though everyone I disagree with 
is biased, I think, makes the concept of bias significantly less useful. It’s a pretty familiar feature 
of our political culture that those on the left view those on the right as biased, and vice versa. 
Indeed, there’s a rather cynical cottage industry of books about the media designed to exploit this 
– one set accusing the “mainstream media” of pervasive right-wing bias, and another set accusing 
it of pervasive left-wing bias.10 I suspect that such accusations of “bias” often amount simply to 
disagreement with what the relevant source says. But we might have been hoping that the charge 
of bias would amount to something more than that.  
At our most hopeful, we might have hoped at least in principle for criteria for biased 
reporting that can themselves be applied in a non-partisan manner – such that you and I could 
recognize and agree on signs of biased reporting even though we have substantive first-order 
political disagreements. The second conception of bias gives up on this hope. Moreover, on such 
a view, it also doesn’t seem like we can reasonably hope to persuade others who don’t share our 
views to improve their epistemic practices. For if, when I claim that you’re relying on a biased 
source, my grounds are simply that your source doesn’t comport with what I believe to be true, 
then I can hardly expect that to move you to change your epistemic practices.  
Relatedly, if we advise people to consume only unbiased sources, where ‘unbiased’ is read 
in the second way, the de facto result of people trying to follow this norm will be that each person 
consumes only sources that conform with their own political views. Since it’s trivial that each 
individual thinks their own views are true, each person will think that sources that conform with 
their own views are unbiased, and so it will seem to each individual that they are following the 
norm of consuming only unbiased media sources when they just read those sources that conform 
with their own views.11 Now, admittedly, those individuals who have false beliefs will be wrong 
that they are conforming to the norm; the norm doesn’t in fact license every individual being 
partisan (I’ll consider a different view that does embrace that result in the next section). That said, 
again, I consider the project here to be one in non-ideal theory, and one way in which non-ideal 
theory differs from ideal theory is that the former tries to pick and endorse norms that it’s actually 
good to advise people to (do their best to) follow. This can be seen as a consequence of taking 
seriously the limitations that affect our performance in conforming with “ideal” norms. 
Neither conception of bias surveyed so far, then, seems to plug into the norm “consume 
only unbiased sources” in a way that makes the norm plausible. Indeed, neither seems to be a good 
conception of bias in and of itself. So should we conclude that bias is a flawed, ill-defined concept? 
This would be too hasty. Both of the first two conceptions of bias focus on what news outlets say: 
respectively, on whether what they say is “even-handed”, and whether it is true. In my view, a 
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more promising conception of bias turns away from a focus on what is said toward the explanation 
of why it is said. On this conception of bias, biased reporting is reporting that has been influenced 
in one or more of a particular cluster of illicit ways, all of which are in some good sense “non-
epistemic” factors. In section 4, I will discuss which ways count as illicit in more detail. For present 
purposes, however, the question is whether this conception of bias is what we need to make the 
first competitor view work. And even without spelling out what sorts of influences are illicit, we 
can already see that, though this is a promising conception of bias, it doesn’t ultimately help out 
the first competitor view. 
First, whilst it’s relatively easy to determine what a news outlet is saying, it’s much harder 
to determine why they said it. The latter is a psychological question that requires knowing what 
psychological mechanisms were operative in the relevant journalists and editors. So, to the extent 
that bias is a matter of reporting’s being influenced in illicit ways, it becomes hard for the average 
news consumer to know whether a particular news outlet is biased. Thus, the norm “consume only 
unbiased media sources” becomes extremely hard to follow. Maybe there are some extreme 
offenders that it’s easy to know about: if a news channel is being bankrolled by the oil industry, 
there are good reasons to be suspicious of its coverage of environmental issues. But many cases 
will be hard to know about. I’m not saying that our default should be to assume that news outlets 
aren’t influenced illicitly; it’s just as hard to know that a given news outlet isn’t being influenced 
illicitly. This still makes it hard to follow the norm “consume only unbiased media sources” on 
this conception of bias. Again, I don’t take that to count against the conception of bias as a 
conception of bias, but it does count against the norm, at least construed as actionable advice.  
In the absence of being able to confidently make judgments about the psychological 
mechanisms at work in individual reporters, we are forced to rely on general background evidence 
about the likelihood of such mechanisms being at work. But the evidence strongly suggests that 
we are all vulnerable to being influenced by non-epistemic factors in belief-formation; it isn’t a 
vice limited to one side of the political spectrum (see section 5).12 Maybe one could hold that there 
are some media sources that are resistant enough to these sorts of influences to count as sufficiently 
unbiased for the purposes of the norm “consume only unbiased media sources”. But if that’s so, I 
don’t see any reason to expect those sources to all align on one side of the political spectrum, and 
so then the norm ceases to compete with my view that we should diversify our media consumption. 
   
3. Second Competitor View: Across-The-Board Partisanship 
 
In considering the second conception of bias above, I objected that given this conception of bias, 
the advice to consume only unbiased media sources will have the de facto result of encouraging 
everyone to be partisan in their media consumption, consuming only news media that aligns with 
their own political point of view. As I acknowledged, though, the view I was considering doesn’t 
affirm that such behavior is actually reasonable, across the board. Rather, it only affirms that it’s 
reasonable for those who genuinely have correct beliefs to be partisan. A different view, recently 
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defended by Regina Rini (2017) positively embraces the view that everyone can permissibly be 
partisan in their decisions about which media sources to trust.13  
Rini describes herself as “defend[ing] partisan epistemology”, Rini (2017, p.50). But since 
her view licenses practices of epistemic partisanship for everyone, in a sense Rini’s epistemology 
is highly non-partisan. It doesn’t say that individuals on the left are justified in being epistemically 
partisan, but that the right isn’t (or vice versa); rather, it says that those on the left are being 
reasonable in being partisan toward left-leaning media sources, and that those on the right are 
being reasonable in being partisan toward right-leaning media sources. Why does Rini think this? 
She writes: 
 
“When I learn that another person shares my partisan affiliation, I learn that she and I share 
at least some significant number of normative values. Or, to put it another way, I learn that 
she tends to get normative questions right (by my normative lights). She establishes herself 
as a more reliable normative judge than I would take her to be by default, or especially if 
she were affiliated to an opposed party.” (Rini 2017, p.51; her italics) 
 
Rini’s conclusion is that being partisan in one’s practices of epistemic trust, specifically with 
respect to news sources, is “compatible with individual virtue” (ibid., p.43) and is “reasonable” 
(ibid., p.54). 
As I see it, there are two problems with Rini’s argument. The first is that she tacitly assumes 
a tendentious kind of epistemic subjectivism.14 Rini seems to be assuming that if some co-partisan 
of mine tends to get normative questions right by my lights, that suffices for making (or at least 
strongly contributes toward making) my decision to invest greater trust in her reasonable. This is 
highly questionable. Many philosophers deny that I can “bootstrap” my way into being reasonable 
in Ф-ing simply by believing that I ought to Ф or by believing propositions that if true would make 
it the case that I ought to Ф.15 To take an example that is close to home in debates about trust, 
consider the phenomenon of testimonial injustice, whereby one gives someone less trust than one 
epistemically ought to due to ethically bad (paradigmatically, prejudiced) misjudgments of their 
trustworthiness.16 This characterization makes vivid that testimonial injustice is based on a 
misjudgment of a speaker’s trustworthiness. So, it follows that whenever I commit a testimonial 
injustice, it’s nevertheless the case that in my judgment – and thus, by my lights – the speaker isn’t 
(that) trustworthy. In at least many cases of epistemic injustice, this judgment of mine will be 
explicit, and in some it will be part of a broader and more systematic constellation of judgments 
or “lights” such that by my lights the speaker isn’t trustworthy. (Consider the explicit racist who 
thinks that black people constantly lie or forget the truth and thus can’t be trusted.)  
I take it that few would claim that, in these cases, the fact that the speaker is untrustworthy 
by my lights suffices to make, or even seriously contributes towards making, my distrust of the 
speaker reasonable or justified or virtuous, in any non-anemic sense. It’s just not that easy to make 
my dismissal of the speaker’s testimony reasonable. The concept of testimonial injustice is situated 
within a critical project that holds us to higher standards than this. But if that’s so, why think that 
8 
 
the mere fact that a media source is untrustworthy by my lights makes it reasonable to discount it 
– or that its being trustworthy by my lights makes it reasonable to trust it? More broadly, the kind 
of subjectivism that Rini is assuming here also has the effect of licensing extremely dogmatic 
epistemic practices. For example, in instances of peer disagreement, it’s clearly true that by my 
lights my disputant has got things wrong: does that make it reasonable for me to dismiss my 
disputant’s view and remain steadfast? This seems far too quick a resolution to the peer 
disagreement debate.  
The second problem with Rini’s argument is that one that she recognizes (Rini 2017, p.52). 
Rini identifies my co-partisans as those who share my normative values. Even granting the 
subjectivist assumptions that I’ve just been putting pressure on, this seems to only yield the 
conclusion that I’m reasonable in giving their testimony on normative matters more weight. But it 
seems that this falls far short of making it reasonable to trust partisan media sources generally, 
since news reporting (while doubtlessly often normatively loaded) has at least a descriptive 
component. And it’s not clear why I should think that someone who shares my normative values 
is a more reliable source of descriptive information. 
Rini’s answer to this objection (ibid., pp. 52-3) is that even when a news source is reporting 
descriptive information, its decisions about which descriptive information to communicate is based 
on, and implicates, normative claims about which descriptive information is important. I entirely 
agree with this claim – and will discuss it further in section 4b below – but I don’t see how it helps 
Rini out here. For even if I think some source is reliable in making judgments about which 
descriptive claims are (if true) important, this provides no direct support for thinking that the source 
is reliable in determining which descriptive claims are true. And it’s the latter question that’s 
relevant for determining whether to believe the descriptive claims that the source makes. So I don’t 
see how Rini’s point explains why it’s reasonable to be partisan in deciding which media outlets 
to trust, in the sense of giving strong evidential weight to their testimony in forming beliefs about 
descriptive claims.  
 One might object that even if Rini’s argument fails to establish that we should trust those 
on our own political side more (as she claims), it might still show that we should listen to those on 
our own political side more. For supposing that we have limited time to devote to consuming news, 
we might want to devote that time to consuming news from outlets that are likely to cover the most 
important stories. And here the issue of whether the source is reliable in making judgments about 
which descriptive claims are important is relevant. I will respond to this objection at the end of 
section 4b, when I’ll have introduced a distinction that helps me to answer it. But in any case, it at 
most disarms my second objection to Rini, and not my first. 
 
4. When Are Influences on Reporting Illicit? 
 
In section 2, I said that on a promising conception of bias, biased reporting is reporting that has 
been influenced in one or more of a cluster of illicit ways, all of which are in some sense “non-
epistemic”. I now want to say more about exactly which kinds of influences count as illicit in the 
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relevant sense. This will help me to set the stage for my positive argument for diversifying one’s 
sources. 
To begin, we need to distinguish two stages at which the illicit influence might enter. First, 
a journalist’s (descriptive) beliefs about some potential news story (its accuracy, the credibility of 
the sources involved, and so on) might be illicitly influenced. Secondly, a journalist’s decision 
about which of two or more potential news stories to give air-time to might be illicitly influenced. 
Which influences are illicit, exactly, will depend on which stage we’re considering. Let’s take 
them in turn. 
 
a) Illicit influences on belief 
 
To the extent that we’re focused on the first stage, that of belief-formation, media bias can be 
assimilated to biases in belief-formation more generally. The paradigm of an illicit influence here, 
and the one I’ll focus on, is “motivated reasoning”, where (in the terms of Kunda 1990), one lets 
one’s “directional” goals (i.e. aims or desires to reach some particular conclusion about whether 
p) influence one’s reasoning about whether p, overcoming one’s “accuracy” goals (i.e. aims or 
desires to reach an accurate answer as to whether p).17 As Kunda stresses, one’s directional goals 
don’t typically influence one’s beliefs directly; rather, they typically do so indirectly, by causing 
one to engage in selective filtering and processing of evidence that favors the conclusion one wants 
to reach. 
There are various reasons why one might have such directional goals. Some such goals are 
due to material or financial incentives. If the funder or owner of some news organization believes 
that climate change is not man-made, and reporters know that their jobs depend on towing that 
line, but they also don’t want to think of themselves as liars, then they might (perhaps 
subconsciously) want it to be true that climate change is not man-made. If a reporter is influenced 
to believe that climate change is not man-made for this reason, then they are being influenced in 
an illicit way that clearly counts as a kind of bias. 
A more complex and subtle, but very common, source of directional goals is one’s pre-
existing normative views. We have to be careful about exactly when being influenced by one’s 
pre-existing normative views constitutes an example of motivated reasoning, that is, of being 
influenced by directional goals. Clearly, it need not necessarily be a vice to reason from one’s pre-
existing normative views to reach further conclusions that follow from those views.18 What seems 
distinctively epistemically vicious is to let one’s normative views influence one’s conclusions 
about descriptive matters of fact upon which the normative claims do not bear.19 Dan Kahan has 
dubbed this phenomenon “cultural cognition”.20 To stick with the climate change example, it 
would be epistemically vicious to let one’s normative view that government regulation of 
individual behavior is a bad thing influence one’s descriptive belief about whether man-made 
climate change is real. For even if government regulation is a bad thing, that simply doesn’t 
evidentially bear on whether man-made climate change is real.21 
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I’ll explore two ways in which one’s normative view that government regulation is a bad 
thing might influence one’s belief about whether man-made climate change is real; this will help 
to see how such influences constitute motivated reasoning. To illustrate the first way, consider 
Jayla. Jayla believes that government regulation of individual behavior is a bad thing, but her belief 
that it is bad rests at least in part upon the empirical assumption that government regulation leads 
to worse outcomes (measured in, say, utilitarian terms) than a laissez-faire approach.22 To illustrate 
the second way, consider Bobby, who believes that government regulation is an inherently bad 
thing, even when its effects would be good: he thinks it is an invasion of personal rights and 
liberties. 
For both Jayla and Bobby, the fact that climate change is man-made is a potentially 
“inconvenient truth”.23 If climate change is man-made, and the scale of the threat that it poses is 
huge, then very plausibly, averting environmental catastrophe requires some measure of regulation 
of individual behavior. (By contrast, if climate change isn’t man-made, the solution can’t be to 
regulate human activity.) However, the sense in which the fact that climate-change is man-made 
is inconvenient differs for Jayla and Bobby. For Jayla, the truth is inconvenient because it directly 
undermines her normative belief. Jayla’s normative belief that regulation is bad (in the sense of: 
to be avoided) explicitly rests upon the assumption that it does more harm than good (in utilitarian 
terms). But if regulation is a prerequisite of avoiding environmental armageddon, that assumption 
is hard to sustain, at least with respect to the example of environmental regulation. But even though 
Jayla’s normative belief rests upon empirical assumptions, she might nevertheless be quite 
psychologically attached to this normative belief. Given that, she might be motivated to deny 
claims – such as the claim that climate change is man-made – that undermine the empirical 
assumption upon which the normative belief, in turn, rests. Needless to say, this pattern – being 
motivated to deny the veracity of counter-evidence in order to preserve a belief that, by one’s own 
lights, there is no reason to hold in the presence of such counter-evidence – is perverse.24 
Nevertheless, it seems to be fairly common.25  
 Bobby’s belief that regulation is bad, by contrast, does not rest on any empirical 
assumptions that are undermined by the fact that climate change is man-made. That said, this fact 
may still be an inconvenient truth for Bobby in a different way, namely that it gives rise to 
psychologically uncomfortable trade-offs. Given that climate change is man-made, Bobby is faced 
with an uncomfortable trade-off between the kind of government regulation that he believes to be 
inherently bad or unjust, and the possibility of environmental catastrophe. Bobby can avoid facing 
down this psychologically uncomfortable trade-off by denying that climate change is man-made, 
so that the conflict between preserving personal liberty and avoiding environmental catastrophe 
never arises. Bobby might be motivated to deny that climate change is man-made, so as to avoid 
facing down this trade-off. 
 To the extent that he is so motivated, Bobby, like Jayla, seems clearly irrational. Though 
trade-offs are uncomfortable to face, there is no general a priori reason to suppose that they do not 
arise for many political issues. Here it’s important to keep straight the distinction between two 
kinds of (in)congruence that are sometimes inadequately distinguished. There is a very loose sense 
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in which the belief that regulation is inherently bad (because freedom-inhibiting), and the belief 
that such regulation is necessary to prevent environmental disaster, are not “congruent”. As we’ve 
just seen, given our desire to avoid facing down trade-offs, they may be psychologically 
uncomfortable to hold together. Moreover, the two beliefs (if true) provide conflicting pro tanto 
reasons to pursue incompatible courses of action: the former, to avoid environmental regulation, 
and the latter, to pursue it. That said, the beliefs are perfectly logically consistent with one another, 
and there’s nothing rationally incoherent about holding both of them. Indeed, neither (even if true) 
provides any pro tanto evidence against the other.26 And though (as just noted), if both beliefs are 
true, there are conflicting pro tanto reasons to pursue incompatible courses of action, that’s life; 
it’s something that happens (unlike logical contradictions). So in a stronger sense of ‘incongruent’, 
there’s nothing incongruent about the two beliefs.  
Some of the psychological literature on cognitive dissonance and related topics seems to 
throw together the weaker kind of incongruence with the stronger kind of incongruence when using 
words like ‘incongruent’, ‘dissonant’, ‘incoherent’ and ‘inconsistent’.27 This obscures an 
otherwise clear normative asymmetry between the weaker and stronger kinds of incongruence. 
Various complications notwithstanding, having beliefs that are incongruent in the stronger sense 
– that are logically inconsistent, or that evidentially undermine one another – is an epistemic defect. 
By contrast, there is nothing epistemically defective about having beliefs that are incongruent only 
in the weaker sense of being psychologically uncomfortable to hold together, or of providing 
conflicting pro tanto reasons for incompatible courses of action. So, correspondingly, whereas the 
desire to eliminate the stronger kind of incongruence might be understood (again, complications 
notwithstanding) as an “epistemic” or “accuracy” goal that it might be epistemically rational to 
pursue, the desire to eliminate the weaker kind of incongruence is clearly a “directional” goal, and 
pursuit of it is a kind of epistemically irrational motivated reasoning. Bobby falls into the latter, 
rather than the former, category. 
 
b) Illicit influences on decisions about what to report 
 
Let’s now pass to the second stage at which illicit influences on reporting might enter – that of 
influences on which facts journalists choose to give airtime to. Here, arguably, it’s less easy to 
determine what amounts to an “illicit” influence than at the first stage. When we’re talking about 
influences on belief, it’s at least a good rule of thumb that “non-epistemic” influences are illicit. 
But it’s not clear what it would mean to say that only epistemic considerations ought to determine 
one’s decisions about what to report. Moreover, there are complex ethical questions about 
decisions about what to report that I can’t settle here – for example: is it (always) wrong to report 
one story rather than another because it’s what your audience wants to hear? That said, we can 
describe at least some influences on decisions about what to report that are illicit, as well as some 
that aren’t. In particular, it’s instructive to focus, as we did in the previous subsection, on the 
influence of normative beliefs.  
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Now, there’s a way in which it’s unavoidable that one’s normative outlook influences one’s 
reporting of the descriptive facts. News outlets, obviously, cannot report everything that happens 
in the world on a given day, nor would this be desirable. So they have to decide which stories are 
most important. That is, unavoidably, a value judgment, and has to be informed by normative 
considerations. So, a news outlet might have to decide whether an accident that killed two people 
in a local town is more newsworthy than a bomb attack in a faraway country that killed one 
hundred.28 Different normative views will yield different answers here, and some of these answers 
may be more plausible than others. But the influence of normative views as such is not out of place 
here, as it was with letting one’s normative views determine one’s descriptive beliefs. For that 
reason, while it seems perfectly appropriate to criticize news outlets for making the wrong moral 
decisions about which news stories to cover, I don’t think it’s appropriate to describe such 
decisions (where they really do result simply from a mistaken evaluation of what’s most 
newsworthy) as “biased”. Given that everyone will have to be influenced by their normative views 
in deciding what to cover, to describe such influence as “biased” only when the normative views 
in questions are ones that we disagree with is to revert to the partisan conception of bias that I 
argued against in section 2. 
That said, there is a different way in which one’s normative convictions might influence 
one’s decisions about which descriptive facts to give airtime to, that does seem to constitute a kind 
of bias. It mirrors the illicit influence of normative views on descriptive beliefs identified in the 
previous subsection. Recall that some descriptive truths are inconvenient for particular normative 
views; this might illicitly motivate some people to avoid believing those truths. But it also might 
motivate some reporters not to report those truths. To the extent that some reporters are motivated 
not to report information because it is inconvenient for their, or their news organization’s, 
normative stance, I suggest, they are succumbing to a kind of bias, and being influenced illicitly 
in their decisions about what to report.  
Again, this inconvenience could either be a matter of the facts in question undermining the 
normative stance, or a matter of their throwing up difficult trade-offs or conflicts given that 
normative stance. Moreover, now we’re talking about decisions about what to report, the fact in 
question may be inconvenient for the purposes of persuading an audience. Consider a talk show 
host who is strongly against government regulation. Since we’re considering the second stage 
rather than the first, let’s stipulate that the talk show host does believe that climate change is man-
made. So his anti-government regulation views, by hypothesis, have not biased his belief about 
whether climate change is man-made. Nevertheless, nor has his belief that climate change is man-
made shaken his anti-government regulation views: perhaps he simply doesn’t care about averting 
environmental catastrophe or about the well-being of future generations. Still, the talk show host 
might recognize that, were his audience to come to believe that climate change is man-made, it 
might shake their anti-government regulation views. And for that reason, he might choose to avoid 
reporting on the evidence for man-made climate change. Here, the fact that climate change is man-
made is not inconvenient for the talk show host’s own stance per se, since his stance is simply 
impervious to this fact. But it is inconvenient for his goal of persuading others of his stance. 
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 It’s really important, I think, to pull apart the two different ways that I’ve just described in 
which a reporter might be influenced by her normative views in deciding what to report. To 
reiterate, on the first way, the reporter picks Story A over Story B because given her normative 
views, it follows that Story A is more newsworthy than Story B. On the second way, the reporter 
picks Story C over Story D because Story D is inconvenient for her normative views. These two 
kinds of influence are crucially different, in kind and normatively. The former kind is only 
criticizable insofar as the reporter’s normative views are mistaken, and even then, not (thereby) 
for bias as such. The second kind of influence, by contrast, is in principle illicit and biased, 
regardless of the correctness of the reporter’s normative views. 
 This bears directly on the point that I mentioned on behalf of Rini at the end of section 3. 
The objection was that given that we have limited time to consume media, it makes sense to listen 
to the sources that have (by our lights) the correct normative views, since they’ll make decisions 
about what to cover that reflect those correct normative views. But this only takes into account the 
first, virtuous, way in which a news organization’s normative views might influence their decisions 
about what to report. It neglects the counterbalancing danger of the second, non-virtuous, way in 
which a news organization’s normative views can influence their decisions about what to report. 
As I’ll be arguing later, it’s in part because of that danger that we’re obligated to diversify our 
media consumption. 
 
5. Illicit Influences Across the Political Spectrum 
 
Throughout the last section, in seeking to explain which influences on reporting are, illicit I used, 
in various forms, the example of climate change denial. This example is, of course, a safe one for 
a left-liberal audience. But the empirical evidence on motivated reasoning and related influences 
on belief and choice suggests that these phenomena are pervasive, and not limited to one side of 
the political spectrum.29 To take a specific example, a study conducted by Lord, Ross & Lepper 
(1979) shows that normative orientations concerning the death penalty caused biased processing 
of evidence regarding the descriptive question of whether the death penalty deters crime, for 
groups on both sides of the issue.  
To give a more speculative but hopefully illustrative example, consider left-wing 
protectionists such as Bernie Sanders who seek to protect domestic jobs through protectionist trade 
measures.30 Unlike right-wing, overtly nationalist protectionists such as Donald Trump, left-wing 
protectionists are reluctant to think of protectionist trade measures as designed to protect domestic 
jobs at the expense of the global poor. Rather, left-wing protectionists often claim that their 
protectionist measures will also benefit the global poor, since (according to them) liberalized trade 
exploits and therefore harms the global poor.31  
But the claim that Western protectionism would benefit the global poor flies in the face of 
the most basic tenets of economic theory, and is rejected by the overwhelming majority of experts 
on both trade and development (who disagree on a wide variety of other theoretical and policy 
questions).32 Note that the question here is not the (somewhat) more disputed one of whether it 
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can benefit developing countries to protect their own industries, nor that of whether Western 
protectionism does in fact maximize domestic (Western) employment in the long-run. Rather, it is 
just of whether Western protectionism benefits the poor in developing countries. And on that claim, 
there is little to no dispute among the relevant experts.33 (Of course, left-wing protectionists might 
propound conspiracy theories about why all these experts are biased or lying, but it is hard to see 
how such conspiracy theories have any better epistemic standing than equivalent conspiracy 
theories propounded to explain away the expert consensus about climate science.)  
In light of this, I offer the admittedly speculative psychological hypothesis that many left-
wing protectionists are engaged in motivated reasoning about the effects of Western protectionism 
on the global poor. On this hypothesis, because such people are committed to protectionist policies 
that are popular with unions and that (in their eyes, at least) protect the domestic working class, 
but they also don’t want to think of themselves as harming the global poor or as sacrificing the 
global poor for American benefit, they are motivated to conclude that protectionism doesn’t hurt, 
and in fact helps, the global poor.  
That wasn’t an example pertaining to media coverage specifically, but it illustrates how 
motivated reasoning can be present on all sides of the political spectrum, and we can expect that 
to apply to the media as well. Indeed, think of how many newspaper op-eds argue, with respect to 
some given issue, that all the relevant considerations line up on the same side of the issue. We’re 
told that some criminal justice policy is bad (or good) for deterring crime, and for racial justice, 
and for public faith in policing. We’re told that some immigration policy is good (or bad) for 
incoming immigrants, and for reducing community tensions, and for economic growth. We’re told 
that some foreign policy initiative is morally just, and protects our domestic security, and advances 
our international standing. Now, maybe on some of these issues, certain policies really are 
beneficial in all relevant respects. But we should at least pause, when we read such op-eds, to note 
how striking it would be if all the significant pro tanto reasons bearing on that policy neatly lined 
up on the same side, and to ask whether the author might be engaged in motivated reasoning, in 
trying to get them to do so. Again, it’s more psychologically comfortable for us not to acknowledge 
the existence of trade-offs; moreover, when we’re engaged in argument with others, we sometimes 
enter a defensive mode where we don’t want to concede anything to the “other side”. So the 
possibility of motivated reasoning seems a real threat – again, regardless of one’s position on the 
political spectrum. 
Likewise, in terms of decisions about what to report, illicit influences seem present on both 
sides of the spectrum. Take the issue of Brexit. It’s doubtlessly true that the right-wing elements 
of the British media were extremely selective in their decisions about what to report, both in the 
run-up to and the aftermath of the Brexit referendums – omitting information that might cast the 
decision to leave the European Union in a bad light.34 That said, similar but inverse behavior is not 
entirely absent in more left-leaning publications. For example, while the immediate crash of the 
pound after the Brexit vote garnered a lot of attention from the left-leaning elements of the media, 
with many proclaiming it as a sign of irreparable damage, reporting of the pound’s subsequent 
recovery to a level relatively close to where it was before the Brexit vote35 has been relatively 
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muted. That’s not, to be fair, to say they haven’t written about it at all. But when they have, it has 
typically been regulated to the ‘Business’ section (rather than the front pages, as the crash was), 
and it has been left out of daily email digests of the most important stories of the day. Similarly, 
despite much prior reporting on the failure of the UK Conservative government’s austerity policies 
to eliminate the deficit on the current budget, the Guardian did not report on their eventual success 
in doing so, unless you count a comment piece arguing that the success wasn’t worth it.36  
To be clear, my argument does not rely on the assumption that all media outlets (or outlets 
on all sides of the media spectrum) are illicitly influenced in their decisions about what to report 
to the same degree as each other.37 As long as all media outlets are illicitly influenced to a non-
trivial degree, it will be problematic to rely on only one source for one’s news. The examples I 
have offered of illicit influences on reporting could each be disputed, but in general, I suggest, we 
have good reason to believe and expect that all outlets are, to some extent, influenced in their 
decisions about what to report (and how much prominence to give it) by how (in)convenient some 
piece of news is, given their prior stances.38 If you’re doubtful of this, I suggest subscribing to the 
daily email updates from a left-leaning newspaper and a right-leaning newspaper (say, in the UK, 
the Guardian and the Times) – and just comparing them over a two-week period, noticing the 
stories that each covers but the other doesn’t, and which aspects of the stories they both cover they 
choose to focus on.39 For these two publications, at least, you won’t find outright descriptive 
falsehoods in either publication. But you will, I predict, find that each newspaper to some degree 
plays down news that isn’t convenient for its editorial line – which you can only really see by 
comparing with the other publication’s coverage. And you might learn about some inconvenient 
truths for your own views, whatever those views are. 
 
6. Conclusion: Why We’re Obligated to Diversify Our Sources 
 
This leads me into what I’ve been building up to throughout the last two sections, namely the 
positive argument for why we are in fact obligated to diversify our sources. The argument is, with 
the background work done, relatively simple to make, and it draws together points I’ve already 
been making. I argued that we should expect publications (and individual journalists) on all sides 
of the political spectrum to be, to some degree, illicitly influenced in what they believe, and in 
what they choose to report. When they are illicitly influenced in what they believe, it will be 
epistemically dangerous to take what they say on trust, without considering arguments and 
evidence presented by those with different views. If we restrict ourselves to reputable publications, 
this danger probably primarily surfaces in op-eds and comment pieces. However, illicit influences 
on what to report affect all news coverage. There, the danger is that if publications are prone to 
omit or minimize stories that aren’t convenient for their normative outlook, then reading only news 
sources from any one side of the political spectrum (even if that side is normatively correct) will 
result in getting a skewed, incomplete picture of the evidence.  
As I argued in section 1, we cannot rely on ourselves to correct for the incompleteness of 
this evidence – in part because we are not good at doing so, and in part because in any case we 
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aren’t in a position to gauge just how incomplete the evidence is. Consequently, we ought to cut 
the problem off at the source, to whatever extent we can, by diversifying our sources to gather a 
richer set of evidence. Perhaps we will sometimes reach the conclusion that the other side’s 
evidence doesn’t have much weight; that the information that our own side omitted doesn’t make 
much of a difference to anything that has much import. No doubt that will sometimes be the correct 
reaction. But that isn’t a reason not to even consider the evidence, which is what consuming news 
from only one side amounts to.  
Diversifying our sources isn’t a panacea – we may still unjustifiably dismiss some evidence 
that we should not dismiss. But it is a concrete step that we can take that can make some difference. 
We know that we are prone to confirmation bias – to seeking out evidence that confirms our own 
views.40 In the internet age, this is easier than ever: as Jonathan Haidt (2012, p.99) crisply puts it, 
“whatever you want to believe about the causes of global warming or whether a fetus can feel pain, 
just Google your belief.” Forcing ourselves to consume diverse sources is a way to mitigate this 
tendency to some extent.  
Moreover, I want to suggest, we should do this even if it seems to us that our favorite news 
media source isn’t succumbing to illicit influences on its reporting. For one can’t be justified in 
being confident in this without comparing its output with those of other publications, and seeing 
what it is omitting. Moreover, if we have good general evidence that all humans will be susceptible 
to illicit influences, journalists included, then this constitutes evidence that particular news sources 
will be susceptible to these influences, regardless of their political orientation. Finally, to the extent 
that this general evidence suggests that I myself may be biased in evaluating whether my favorite 
news source is biased,41 it is a higher-order defeater of my belief that my favorite news source isn’t 
biased (for it suggests that my sense of having strong evidence for this belief is in fact a product 
of bias).   
Some may wonder if the obligation to consume news from a diverse range of sources 
requires them to read news sources that are apparently “beyond the pail”. My response is that it 
need not. If one really is justified in believing that a particular source is simply factually unreliable, 
then there are independent epistemic reasons not to consume it. That said, I think we may in general 
overestimate the extent to which news sources on the “other side” are factually unreliable. I 
occasionally read the website of Fox News (which counts as the “other side” for me), and I rarely 
find anything that appears straightforwardly descriptively false. My objections to its coverage lie 
primarily in the normative views that it espouses in its comment pieces (and implied in how it 
frames much of its news coverage), and in its selectivity in what it chooses to cover. It also often 
hides its own opinions behind qualifiers like “critics are saying that…”, but this is fairly ubiquitous 
across news outlets of all political stripes. I actually think that, if they have the time to do so, left-
liberals can learn something instructive by occasionally reading or watching Fox News. But there 
may well be better representatives of “the other side” to consume instead, and I don’t say that one 
is obligated to consume news from every outlet. 
Even with that clarification, reading news from multiple sources across the political 
spectrum may seem very demanding and time-consuming. My primary response to this is simply 
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that even if one holds the amount of news one consumes fixed, it’s still better to consume it from 
a politically diverse range of sources than to consume it from a single source. But I’ll also close 
with one further point. I have argued that we should consume news from media outlets across the 
political spectrum. But even just relying on one (reputable) source, reading it by starting on its 
home page, or with its daily email digest, is an improvement on an increasingly common way of 
consuming news, namely that of consuming it by clicking on links shared on social media. For the 
news stories you see on social media are filtered twice or in some cases three times: first by the 
news organization itself, then by the friends in your social network, and finally (sometimes) by the 
social media platform in using algorithms that use your own political preferences to pick which of 
your friends’ posts to show you.  
At each of these stages, your evidence is getting filtered in a way that makes it more and 
more selective. If you start with the front page or email digest of a news publication, you get only 
the first stage of filtering – so if the news organization has, conscientiously, reported on something 
that is “inconvenient” for its own normative outlook, you are more likely to see it. And so even 
this practice is an improvement on what many of us, increasingly, do.42 
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Notes 
1 Wodak (ms.) defends roughly the same conclusion, but on different grounds. I hope to have an opportunity to engage 
with his arguments elsewhere. 
2 For relevant data, see e.g. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013); Ballantyne (2015). 
3 Perhaps not always, though. See Buchak (2010) for discussion. 
4 This will perhaps not be entirely uncontroversial. Many epistemologists are skeptical of epistemic consequentialism, 
according to which beliefs are evaluated according to their (expected) epistemic consequentialism (with respect to 
true belief and/or knowledge), on the grounds that the fact that my having some belief p is likely to lead to other true 
or known beliefs in future doesn’t make it more justified or rational to believe p itself. (See, e.g., Berker (2013).) Such 
philosophers might claim that since the epistemic effects of beliefs don’t bear on the epistemic justification of those 
beliefs, the epistemic effects of evidence-gathering procedures don’t ground a sense in which such procedures can be 
epistemically justified either. But I’m not sure about this argument: one might hold that there are good reasons to be 
consequentialist about the epistemic evaluation of evidence-gathering procedures without being consequentialist about 
the epistemic evaluation of beliefs. 
5 Here I’m using ‘responsible’ in the sense whereby it denotes a positive epistemic status, not in the sense concerned 
with whether we are responsible for our beliefs. 
6 This also relates to, but again goes beyond, the point that whether I’m morally culpable for wrongdoing committed 
out of ignorance can depend on whether I was epistemically culpable for the ignorance in question. Compare Rosen 
(2003); Fricker (2016). 
7 It’s worth mentioning, just to clear out of the way, that occasionally in popular discourse being “neutral” between 
political views seems to mean occupying a position in the political center. The “Media Bias Chart”, for example, 
(available at http://www.allgeneralizationsarefalse.com/), which was recently widely shared on social media, 
presupposes that if an outlet doesn’t “skew liberal” or “skew conservative”, it is thereby “neutral”. But this is 
preposterous: centrism is a political outlook like any other, characterized by a distinctive set of views and policy 
proposals, and if it’s possible to be biased in favor of liberalism or conservativism, it’s evidently possible to be biased 
in favor of centrism too. So I pass over this view. 
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8 That’s not to say that this always or even often is how this question is answered. Often, which voices are represented 
in the media is determined simply by what power they have. But I take it that it’s hard to really normatively defend 
that practice. And moreover, even if one did that, the judgment that what determines whether a voice ought to be heard 
is whether it comes from a position of power is still a value judgment in a way that the conception of “unbiased” 
reporting as simply “reporting all sides” obscures. 
9 Of course, on some particular issues, it might be correct to think that everyone, or nearly everyone, who disagrees 
with one’s stance is biased. Perhaps there are some views that fly in the face of evidence to such an extent that bias is 
simply the best explanation of why such views are held. I allow this. What is objectionable about the conception of 
bias I’m presently discussing in not that it will allows me to think that in some cases, everyone who disagrees with me 
is biased, but that it will rationalize (and even require) thinking that in all cases, everyone who disagrees with me is 
biased – merely in virtue of their disagreeing with me, and not on further, independent grounds. Thanks to Joe 
Saunders for helping me to sharpen this point. 
10 Compare, e.g., Brock (2004); Groseclose (2012). 
11 The point here is similar to one that arises in the debate about peer disagreement. The “right reasons” view of 
disagreement (defended by Kelly (2005) and Titelbaum (2015), says (roughly speaking) that if your pre-disagreement 
doxastic state is antecedently rational, then your view need not change in response to disagreement. But of course, 
epistemic akrasia to one side, it’s always going to seem, from the first-person perspective, as if your own pre-
disagreement view is epistemically rational. So the de facto result of advising people to follow the Right Reasons view 
will be that everyone remains steadfast. Part of the motivation behind more conciliatory views about peer disagreement 
is to give advice that takes account of our limitations and fallibility in correctly assessing the evidence. See, e.g. 
Christensen (2013, p.77, 90).  
12 Here I’m also echoing some arguments given by Ballantyne (2015, esp. pp.152-8). 
13 Rini’s argument is situated in the context of a discussion of fake news specifically; she defends the surprising 
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